Abstract-Part II of this paper series focuses on automation of the extended proof-carrying hardware intellectual property (PCHIP) framework for data secrecy protection in third-party IPs, which was presented in part I. Specifically, we introduce: 1) VeriCoq-IFT, an automated PCHIP framework for information flow policies and 2) VeriCoq-H, a hierarchypreserving Verilog-to-Coq converter. VeriCoq-IFT aims to: 1) automate the process of converting designs from an HDL to the Coq formal language; 2) generate security property theorems ensuring compliance with information flow policies; 3) construct proofs for such theorems; and 4) check their validity in a design, with minimal user intervention. VeriCoq-H, on the other hand, seeks to convert the entire functionality of a Verilog design to its Coq representation while preserving design hierarchy. It facilitates the development of hierarchical proofs and enables the construction of hybrid module libraries containing the HDL code and the corresponding reusable lemmas for each module. Applicability of our automated VeriCoq-IFT framework is demonstrated by evaluating trustworthiness of two DES encryption circuits and several genuine and Trojan-infested advanced encryption standard (AES) designs, along with the utility of VeriCoq-H in preventing malicious modification of sensitive data, such as the secret key of an encryption circuit.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS.2017.2707327 ogy and we developed frameworks for information flow tracking (IFT) to ensure that a hardware design is secure in terms of information flow policies. We also presented a new hierarchypreserving methodology for the PCHIP framework, on which our solution for protecting the hardware design against malicious modification of data is based. Despite their tremendous potential, broad deployment of PCHIP-based solutions faces certain challenges. Converting HDL code to a formal representation, such as the Coq [1] language used in PCHIP, and developing proofs for security properties, requires additional knowledge of formal methods, theorem proving environments, and proof writing. Even for someone who has this expertise, the process is tedious and time-consuming, making IP developers hesitant to adopt PCHIP. In this paper, we present our efforts toward automation of the PCHIP framework and we demonstrate the applicability of our methods in detecting design flaws and hardware Trojans in cryptographic cores. The dynamic information flow tracking method presented in part I of this paper series offers the opportunity to develop a fully automated PCHIP framework, specifically geared towards enforcing information flow policies. An initial attempt in this direction was described in our earlier work [2] . VeriCoq-IFT, shown in Fig. 1 , is an automated PCHIP framework for enforcing information flow policies, covering various tasks such as conversion of the design from HDL to the Coq formal language, generating security property theorems that ensure information flow policies, constructing proofs for such theorems, and checking their validity for the design, with minimal user intervention. Herein, we extend the capabilities of VeriCoq-IFT so that it is able to protect not only outputs but also intermediate signals in the design. Additionally, we provide a procedure for automatically establishing the initial sensitivity levels of all signals.
Applicability of VeriCoq-IFT is demonstrated on two different implementations of the data encryption standard (DES) [3] , as well as on the genuine and several Trojan-infested versions of the advanced encryption standard (AES) [4] . Based on minimal input provided by the user, trustworthiness of these circuits with respect to information flow policies is automatically checked. VeriCoq-IFT gathers the required information through special comments (pragmas) inserted in the HDL code by the IP designer. IP consumers, on the other hand, only need to check the validity of these special comments and utilize VeriCoq-IFT to assess the trustworthiness of the acquired design. Any alteration of circuit description against information flow policies causes proofs to fail. This methodology is a first essential step towards establishing PCHIP as a valuable method for assessing credibility of third party IPs with minimal extra effort. We note that, while both a static and a dynamic IFT method were introduced in part I, VeriCoq-IFT is established atop the dynamic one, which supersedes its static counterpart.
An alternative way through which hardware Trojans may introduce harmful actions, and which may not always be detectable through the enforcement of information flow policies using VeriCoq-IFT, is the malicious modification of data, such as the key in a cryptographic core. To prevent such attacks, in part I of this paper series we proposed a solution based on the general PCHIP framework, which involves manual development of security theorems and their proofs. To assist in the process, in our earlier work we introduced VeriCoq [5] , which automates conversion of the design from Verilog to its Coq representation. However, VeriCoq performs the flattened functional conversion presented in part I, removing design hierarchy and, therefore, making manual proof development very challenging. Therefore, herein we introduce VeriCoq-H, an enhanced version of VeriCoq, which automatically converts the Verilog design to its Coq representation following the hierarchy-preserving methodology presented in part I. VeriCoq-H, whose role in the general PCHIP framework is shown in Fig. 2 , enables hierarchical proof development. Additionally, hybrid libraries of hardware modules including proofs of various reusable lemmas can be developed to expedite the proof development for higher-level designs. Consequently, the hierarchy-preserving methodology reduces the proof-writing burden in the PCHIP framework.
Application of VeriCoq-H towards facilitating proof development for security properties which prevent malicious modification of data in cryptographic cores is detailed through an example. We note that this approach is different from the methodology for detecting malicious modification of data in third-party hardware IPs which was introduced in [6] . The latter employs a formal state-space exploration approach for this purpose, which is limited in verifiable clock cycles and cannot guarantee the trustworthiness of the design beyond a given time-stamp. In contrast, the PCHIP-based solution does not have such a restriction.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we illustrate the details of the VeriCoq-IFT framework including conversion to Coq, generation of security property theorems and construction of proofs. In Section III, we depict the hierarchical conversion of the entire functionality of a Verilog design to Coq representation within the general PCHIP framework, as performed by VeriCoq-H. Section IV provides a case study of the static IFT method presented in part I of this paper series and demonstrates the capabilities of VeriCoq-IFT on two implementations of the DES encryption algorithm, and several AES designs including a genuine and various Trojaninfested versions. Additionally, it details the application of VeriCoq-H in preventing malicious modification of the secret key in a DES core. A discussion is provided in Section V and conclusion are drawn in Section VI.
II. VeriCoq-IFT IN DETAIL
VeriCoq-IFT is a comprehensive solution for enforcing information flow policies on hardware designs, as depicted in Fig. 1 . It automates the three intricate tasks of (i) converting the HDL code to Coq representation, (ii) generating theorems enforcing information flow policies, and (iii) providing proofs of such theorems. Then, these three essential pieces are delivered to Coq-IDE, which evaluates the validity of the proofs for the design. While information flow policies appear to be simple in principle (e.g., no sensitive data should leak through untrusted channels), enforcing them in a design is complicated. In the following sections, we explain how VeriCoq-IFT automates these three main tasks in the PCHIP framework to ensure trustworthiness with respect to information flow policies.
A. Conversion to Coq Representation
VeriCoq-IFT builds upon the HDL-to-Coq conversion rules defined in the original PCHIP framework [7] [8] [9] [10] and in part I of this paper series and enhances them with additional rules which consider not only precise tracking of signals in the design but also automation requirements. In this section, we illustrate the conversion of Verilog constructs to their Coq representation, as performed by VeriCoq-IFT. For this purpose, we utilize the partial Verilog source code of a DES encryption core [11] , shown in Fig. 3 , and its Coq representation generated by VeriCoq-IFT, as it appears in Fig. 4 .
1) Sensitivity (Secrecy) Tags: To enforce information flow policies, functionality and result of operations are not important. However, a mechanism is required whereby each signal is accompanied by an attribute, or tag, which demonstrates its secrecy or sensitivity level, so that the flow of the signal through the design can be tracked precisely. To this end, VeriCoq-IFT defines the following types in the Coq representation.
Definition sensitivity:=(nat*(option nat)) %type. Definition bus_sensitivity := list sensitivity.
Definition sen_list:= list bus_sensitivity.
sensitivity is the type of the tag maintained for each signal. The first nat in this tuple represents the time stamp in which the secrecy level has been updated, the usage of which is described later. The second one, defined as option nat, represents the actual secrecy level of the signal which evolves in time. Type bus_sensitivity represents the secrecy level of buses and is defined as list sensitivity. Note that VeriCoq-IFT considers all signals in the design, even single-bit ones, as buses. This allows treating single-bit and multi-bit signals in the same manner, without the need for additional definitions. To be able to track the sensitivity levels of buses through the design, as well as their transitions, VeriCoq-IFT defines sen_list which is a list storing the sensitivities of all buses. Each bus has a position in this list, maintaining its current secrecy level. 2) Basic Circuit Elements in Coq Representation: VeriCoq-IFT considers every signal in the design as a bus. Selecting part of a bus is common in HDLs such as Verilog. Also, constants have wide usage in expressions and module instantiations. To facilitate manipulation of buses, partial bus selection and use of constants, and to allow treating them uniformly, VeriCoq-IFT defines inductive type bus as follows. Constructor Id is the main constructor for type bus, which gets a nat representing the corresponding position in the sensitivity list. Fig. 3 . These signals are defined as bus in the Coq representation of Fig. 4 . A challenge for partial selection is that Verilog does not restrict the range of buses to ascending/descending order or to start/end by index 0. Therefore, to prevent complexities in the Coq representation, VeriCoq-IFT normalizes indices in partial selection of buses such that the least significant bit (LSB) of a bus is always referred to by index 0. The Verilog source of Fig. 3 shows two methods of defining and using ranges. Specifically, the LSB of the IP bus has index 64, while it has index 0 in desOut. VeriCoq-IFT normalized the LSB of IP to index 0, as seen in lines 18 and 20 of the converted code in Fig. 4 .
3) Module Definitions: VeriCoq-IFT converts module definitions in the Verilog source code to an inductive type in the Coq representation, similar to what we described for the flattened functional model in part I of this paper series. It creates a constructor for the module and considers module inputs and outputs as parameters of this constructor. The body of the module is created in a function named module_inst. For example, lines 3-11 in Fig. 4 show the created module type definition for the modules defined in the Verilog source code of Fig. 3 . Then, as shown in lines 13-35 of Fig. 4 , VeriCoq-IFT also creates the module_inst function which constitutes the body of the modules. More details on the structure of this function are provided below.
4) Local Signals:
VeriCoq-IFT traces all the signals in a module and, whenever a local signal is needed, it adds it to the parameter list of the module in the Coq representation, even though such signals are not present in the port list of the module in Verilog. For example, consider the local signals defined in lines 12-17 of the des module in Fig. 3 . As lines 15-16 of Fig. 4 show, these signals are considered as parameters for this module in its Coq representation. However, if a local signal is used only to connect module instantiations and is not assigned or read directly inside a module (e.g. K_sub in des module of Fig. 3) , there is no need to treat it as a module parameter. VeriCoq-IFT can correctly identify such local signals and accurately create their equivalent Coq description.
5) Parameters: VeriCoq-IFT supports Verilog numeric parameters which are often defined within modules. Since such parameters can be modified by each module instance, VeriCoq-IFT considers them as additional parameters when defining the module in its Coq representation. It also tracks the parameter definitions in the Verilog source code and passes the correct values for these parameters when creating module instances.
6) Module Instantiations:
To support hierarchy, VeriCoq-IFT tracks module instantiations inside a module and defines them as parameters of the module definition in the Coq representation. For example, the des module in Fig. 3 instantiates two modules named crp and key_sel. As lines 5 and 16 in Fig. 4 show, these modules are added to the definition of the des module in its Coq representation.
VeriCoq-IFT automatically creates a definition for the top module of the Verilog source code, representing the top module instantiation. For this purpose, VeriCoq-IFT creates the appropriate variables, parameters and module instantiations. As lines 37-52 in Fig. 4 show, to instantiate des, VeriCoq-IFT defined the required buses with their corresponding position in the sensitivity list. It also created two module instances required for the des module, namely module_key_sel and module_crp, in order to instantiate module_des. Each of these two module instances require other module instantiations which VeriCoq-IFT creates recursively and are not shown in Fig. 4 In the PCHIP framework for information flow tracking presented in part I, certain operations of each design are considered as sensitivity level reducers (or declassifying operations). In order to identify such sensitivity reducing operations, VeriCoq-IFT defines a special comment (pragma) as /* vericoq sensitivity_reducer */, and wherever it finds this comment in the Verilog source code, it considers the next operation a sensitivity reducer. For cryptographic hardware, we consider the eXclusive-OR operation on secret input and sub-keys as a sensitivity reducer. Consequently, notice the eXclusive-OR operation of line 23 in Fig. 3 which is preceded by this special comment. This operation is contained in the ereduce constructor, as shown in line 21 of its Coq representation in Fig. 4 . We note that not all eXclusive-OR operations are considered sensitivity reducers. Sensitivity reducing operations should be individually marked and these decisions should be verified by the IP consumers using a clean high-level architecture or block diagram of the design.
VeriCoq-IFT also defines the eval function to evaluate expressions and produce the corresponding sensitivity levels. Evaluation of the query operator requires special consideration, which we illustrate next, along with the conditional statements.
8) Assignments and Conditional Statements:
To build the code block in Coq representation, VeriCoq-IFT defines inductive type code as follows. One point to elaborate on in this conversion is that VeriCoq-IFT treats sequential and combinational blocks in the same way. Actually, when evaluating the code to update the sensitivity levels of the signals, all statements are treated sequentially. This does not create any problems for information flow tracking purposes. It may only delay the evolution of the sensitivity levels by a few clock cycles.
The importance of maintaining a time stamp together with the sensitivity levels of signals reveals itself in the evaluation of conditional statements. Since we omit the functionality of the operations in the conversion to Coq representation, there is no way to find out which branch of the condition is taken upon evaluation. Therefore, VeriCoq-IFT evaluates all branches in Coq representation; when updating the sensitivity levels of buses in the assign statements, it uses the maximum value of the sensitivity level produced for a signal on each (virtual) clock cycle. To prevent implicit information leakage through conditions, when evaluating statements inside conditional statements VeriCoq-IFT considers the sensitivity level produced by the condition expression together with each branch.
9) Initial Sensitivity List: To create the initial sensitivity list for the hardware design, VeriCoq-IFT requires knowing which signals carry sensitive information and their sensitivity levels. Thus, to make gathering of such information easier, VeriCoq-IFT defines a special Verilog comment (pragma) in the form of /* vericoq init_sensitivity_level_2 */. This special comment should appear before signal definition in the Verilog source code. Its numeric value, which appears last, is considered as the initial sensitivity level of the signal. Designers determine this value by considering the number of sensitivity reducing operations that the signal experiences through the design. For signals that VeriCoq-IFT finds no such information, it assumes the initial sensitivity to be None.
Note that the initial sensitivity list is comprehensive, containing information for all signals in the design, including inputs, outputs and local signals. When instantiating the top module, VeriCoq-IFT also creates the initial sensitivity list using the information gathered through these comments. To elaborate further, note that the definition of desIn and key in lines 5 and 7 of the des module in Fig. 3 is preceded by such special comments. As seen in lines 54-61 of Fig. 4 , VeriCoq-IFT assumes an initial sensitivity of 1 for desIn and 2 for key in the init_state created in Coq representation.
Finding the exact sensitivity level of sensitive signals requires an understanding of the overall flow of information in the design, and as mentioned before, determining how many sensitivity reducing operations act on those signals before reaching the outputs. To facilitate this task, we can take advantage of VeriCoq-IFT auxiliary capabilities to help the users. For this purpose, designers need to mark the sensitivity reducing operations in the design as explained before. They can use the following procedure to get recommendations on the initial sensitivity levels.
For each sensitive signal bit b: 1) Set the initial sensitivity level of b to a high value, e.g., 100, in the initial sensitivity list. 2) Set the sensitivity level of all other signal bits in the initial sensitivity list to zero. 3) Evaluate the code using the updated initial sensitivity list until a stable list is reached. 4) Check all output bits in the resulting stable sensitivity list and consider the minimum reduction in the sensitivity of the signal seen in the output as the initial sensitivity level of the signal bit b. We note that this procedure should be performed on a clean architecture of the design which only comprises high level blocks and operations, without detailed implementation information. This ensures that any design flaws or malicious design modifications will not interfere with the the task of finding the initial sensitivity levels.
As we explained in this section, the conversion procedure from Verilog code to its Coq representation is completely automated in the VeriCoq-IFT framework, without any user intervention. IP developers are only required to provide necessary information by inserting special comments defined in the VeriCoq-IFT framework into the HDL code. Similarly, IP consumers only need to check the validity of those comments for the corresponding signals and operations.
B. Security Property Theorems
VeriCoq-IFT generates functions and theorems which are required to ensure the trustworthiness of the design in terms of information flow policies. For this purpose, it has a function which is used to evaluate the statements in the code and to update the sensitivity level based on a time-stamp parameter, named check_code_sen. VeriCoq-IFT generates theorems for all the outputs of the top module to ensure that their sensitivity level remains safe at all times. To elaborate further, notice the theorem starting at line 7 of Fig. 5 , which is generated as part of the conversion from Verilog to Coq representation in the VeriCoq-IFT framework. Since the des module in Fig. 3 has only one output, namely desOut, VeriCoq-IFT generates a theorem stating that the sensitivity level of desOut remains safe at all times. This theorem covers all 4 requirements presented as theorem generation functions in part I. Assuming that the initial sensitivity level information and sensitivity reducing operations are provided accurately, proving this theorem ensures that no sensitive information is leaked through this primary output of the design. We describe the details of these theorems in the next section, which illustrates the proof.
Some Trojans may not leak sensitive information to an output of the hardware IP design. Instead, they establish a sidechannel inside the design, e.g., by manipulating the power consumption or the leakage current, to facilitate leaking sensitive information indirectly [12] . While VeriCoq-IFT cannot automatically detect such side-channels, it provides a special comment as /* vericoq force_nonsensitive */ for the designers or, more importantly, the IP consumers, to mark specific signals which they might be suspicious of leaking sensitive information. VeriCoq-IFT also generates security theorems for these specific internal signals, in order to ensure that no sensitive information reaches them.
C. Proofs of Security Theorems
Proofs of security theorems generated by VeriCoq-IFT are constituted in two parts. Since the sensitivity level of the primary inputs does not change and we do not have any sensitivity enhancing operator, the sensitivity list should reach a stable condition in which further code evaluations do not change the sensitivity values in the list. To find the clock cycle at which the sensitivity list becomes stable, VeriCoq-IFT defines a function named find_stable_ list. Using this function, VeriCoq-IFT can automatically find the stable clock cycle, and its usage is found in line 2 of Fig. 5 . This function evaluates the code cycle-by-cycle and returns the clock cycle at which the resulting sensitivity list evaluated in two consecutive clock cycles is equal. Before the sensitivity list stabilizes, VeriCoq-IFT evaluates the code cycle-by-cycle and checks whether the sensitivity of the target signals is safe. This is performed using a function is_safe_bef_stable called specifically for desOut in lines 4-5 of Fig. 5 . To prove this part, VeriCoq-IFT evaluates this function by computation.
After the sensitivity list becomes stable, VeriCoq-IFT uses proof-by-induction. VeriCoq-IFT proves a lemma named check_code_sen_eq_st, which states that after stabilization of the sensitivity list, further evaluation of the code does not change the sensitivity values, and its application is shown in lines 13-17 of the proof in Fig. 5 . Using this lemma, the theorem for not leaking sensitive information is proven. Since the lemma is proven generally for all codes, proofs of all generated security property theorems can be constructed similarly and automatically, which is a big advantage of the VeriCoq-IFT framework.
III. VeriCoq-H: HIERARCHICAL VERILOG
TO COQ CONVERTER Although information flow polices, enforced automatically by VeriCoq-IFT, are able to capture sensitive information leakage through the outputs or suspicious signals, they cannot thoroughly prevent or capture malicious modifications of sensitive data in the design. As an example of such malicious modifications, consider a hardware Trojan which, upon activation, sets the key to a constant or a value created from the plaintext or the original key through a transformation known to the attacker. Such action might not be detected by functional tests due to its rare activation, yet can disrupt the core functionality and leak sensitive information because the attacker obtains the key.
In order to protect the hardware design against such attacks, in part I of this paper series we presented a solution based on the general PCHIP framework. As opposed to the PCHIP framework for information flow policies implemented by VeriCoq-IFT, which does not consider the functionality of operations and only tracks the flow of information, the general PCHIP methodology converts the exact functionality of the circuit to the Coq representation. Using this general framework, security properties which prevent malicious modifications of data can be developed and proven. We note that, besides conversion of the design to its corresponding Coq representation, generating these security properties and proving them is design-dependent, still requires the developer's effort, and is not yet automated.
Earlier, we introduced VeriCoq [5] for automated conversion of the exact functionality of a hardware design in Verilog to its corresponding Coq representation based on the hierarchy flattening methodology presented in Part I. A key limitation in VeriCoq is, that similar to VeriCoq-IFT, it flattens the design hierarchy. For information flow policies, flattening the hierarchy helps to automate the entire framework including the proofs. In case of the general PCHIP, however, it makes the manual development of proofs for security property theorems complicated. In this section, we introduce an enhanced version of VeriCoq, namely VeriCoq-H, which converts the design to its Coq representation according to the hierarchy-preserving methodology of part I. As we mentioned earlier, this conversion approach enables the development of hierarchical proofs and proof reuse. Lemmas proven in sub-modules can be applied to prove theorems in higher level modules. A similar hierarchical security theorem proving process has also been demonstrated on a large-scale SoC design [13] . Moreover, a library of modules can be created, including the lemmas and proofs for each module, and utilized for the development of new designs as well as the proof of their security properties. The evolution of such a module library will extensively reduce the burden of proof development for IP designers who choose to utilize the PCHIP framework in production. Fig. 6 shows the partial hierarchical Coq representation of the DES core of Fig. 3 generated by VeriCoq-H, following the hierarchical formal model presented in Part I. To assist with understanding it, a few details or additional capabilities of VeriCoq-H are described below.
A. Parameters
VeriCoq-H handles Verilog numeric parameters similar to VeriCoq-IFT and considers them as additional arguments when defining the module through the instantiate function in its Coq representation. It also tracks the parameter definitions in the Verilog source code and passes the correct values for these parameters when creating module instances.
B. Top Module Instantiation
VeriCoq-H automatically creates an axiom for the top module of the Verilog source code, representing the top module instantiation. For this purpose, VeriCoq-H creates the appropriate variables, parameters and module instantiation. As lines 65-74 in Fig. 6 show, a Module Type is defined for the top module and an axiom is created to instantiate des, corresponding to des module as the top module in the Verilog source code of Fig. 3 .
C. Part Selection
VeriCoq-H handles part selection similar to VeriCoq-IFT and uses the same [ , ] notation. Likewise, it normalizes indices in part selection of buses such that the least significant bit (LSB) of a bus is always referred to by index 0. As an example, note the part selection of signal IP in lines 46 and 50 of the Coq representation in Fig. 6 , corresponding to lines 19-20 of the Verilog source code of Fig. 3 .
The code generated by VeriCoq-H, as partially shown in Fig. 6 , is directly usable in the Coq environment to develop proofs for the desired security properties, such as theorems which prevent malicious modification of data in cryptographic cores, as we show in Section IV-C. The first line of Fig. 6 imports a Coq library containing the general PCHIP definitions.
IV. DEMONSTRATION ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC HARDWARE
In this section, we demonstrate the capabilities of the extended PCHIP frameworks by evaluating trustworthiness of two DES cores provided in [11] and several genuine and Trojan-infested AES cores offered in [14] . We first demonstrate the static IFT approach on an area efficient DES implementation. We then show how the dynamic IFT methodology implemented by VeriCoq-IFT can be used to evaluate trustworthiness of various genuine and Trojan-infested cryptographic cores. Finally, using two Trojan-infested DES cores, we showcase the effectiveness of the PCHIP framework, as enhanced through the hierarchy-preserving capabilities of VeriCoq-H, in detecting malicious data modifications. Details of the Verilog source codes, the corresponding Coq representations and proofs can be found in the supplementary material.
A. Evaluation of DES Cores
A block diagram of the DES [3] algorithm is shown in Fig. 7 . It includes 16 rounds, preceded and succeeded by initial and final permutations. We mark the eXclusive-OR operations of each round and the one inside the cipher function as sensitivity reducing operations. Since permutations and rotations are deterministic, we do not consider them as sensitivity reducing operations. Input text and key are considered sensitive and their initial sensitivity levels are assigned accordingly. 
1) Area Efficient DES Core:
Since encryption rounds in the DES algorithm are similar, the first DES core, of which part of the Verilog code is shown in Fig. 3 , implements a single round. Several iterations are then invoked to perform the entire encryption. The iteration number, which is determined by the roundSel input, is also considered sensitive. a) Static methodology: First, we show how the static IFT approach can be used for evaluating this core. The des module of Fig. 3 , instantiates two sub-modules, the Feistel function (crp.v) and the key generator (key_sel.v) to perform round encryption/decryption and round key generation, respectively. Detailed analysis of the code reveals a potential sensitive information leakage for this DES core, which might occur in the first round. As is evident in Fig. 7 , the right half of the input text, after the initial permutation, does not go through a sensitivity reduction operation (eXclusive-OR). Rather, it goes directly to the second round. Analysis of the partial Verilog source code of Fig. 3 , focusing on desIn, IP, Lout, FP and desOut, reveals the same observation. Since the permutation operations are deterministic, at least part of the sensitive input desIn can leak to desOut. In essence, this area-efficient design only implements one round of the algorithm and has a potential risk in leaking information, which can be caught by PCHIP-based static IFT, as we show below.
Based on the Verilog-to-Coq conversion rules and the formal semantic model of part I, this design is converted to Coq. The complete version of the converted Coq representation for des.v is shown in Fig. 8 .
Static Property Proofs: For each module, we need to denote the signal secrecy tags and prove the data secrecy properties. For the des.v module, among all input, output and internal signals, the input key (key), input plaintext (desIn), input round count (RoundSel), and internal generated round keys (K_sub) require protection. Reflected in Coq formal logic, three axioms are added to indicate the semantics that the key, desIn, RoundSel, and K_sub have sensitive tags in all clock cycles. The separation of signal property denotation axioms and circuit code constitutes a key characteristic of the Coq platform. These axioms act as preconditions for all security properties extracted from the Coq circuit.
Axiom secret_key : forall (t : nat), bus_sen key t = sensitive.
Axiom secret_desIn : forall (t : nat), bus_sen desIn t = sensitive.
Axiom secret_K_sub : forall (t : nat), bus_sen K_sub t = sensitive.
Axiom secret_RoundSel : forall (t : nat), bus_sen roundSel t = sensitive.
With both the preconditions and the DES circuit itself available in Coq representation, the next step is to construct the data secrecy property that we wish to prove and express it also in Coq. Our requirement that "no internal sensitive information is leaked through a primary output" is formalized into the following no_leaking_des theorem in Coq. If the proof can be successfully constructed for the no_leaking_des theorem given the Coq circuit and the preconditions, we can then declare that the delivered HDL code is trusted with respect to data secrecy protection policy. However, the theorem cannot be proven. In fact, we can prove the opposite conclusion, i.e. the DES output is sensitive. This vulnerability stems from the single-round implementation of DES, which is repeatedly used to perform the entire encryption. As illustrated in partial Verilog source code of Fig. 3 , in this implementation the intermediate results are visible at the primary outputs; hence, the right half of the plaintext, which does not go through a sensitivity reducing operation in the first round, becomes exposed and causes the security theorem proof to fail. From an IP customer perspective, this implies that an IP vendor cannot provide a trusted bundle for this DES core since a proof cannot be constructed. While this static IFT approach is effective in successfully revealing design flaws, such as the one mentioned above, it involves a tedious manual process and is more suitable for single-stage or small designs. 
b) Dynamic methodology implemented by VeriCoq-IFT:
We also applied the VeriCoq-IFT framework to evaluate the trustworthiness of this DES core. This automatically converted the design to Coq representation and generated the security theorems and proofs. When provided to Coq-IDE for checking, however, we observed that the checking of proofs fails. This is expected, since as we mentioned in the evaluation by the static approach, this area efficient DES core has the potential of leaking sensitive information. VeriCoq-IFT exposes such inherent potential problems as well as deliberate violation of information flow policies by malicious modifications, automatically and accurately, and is therefore capable of handling larger and more complex designs, as we discuss next.
2) Performance Optimized DES Core: This DES core is implemented in a 16-stage pipeline, optimized for high performance requirements. Evaluation of this pipelined core using the static methodology is difficult, since we need to verify every round of encryption implemented by each pipeline stage separately. For each round, we need to consider its eXclusive-OR operations as sensitivity reducers while considering these operations in other stages as normal and verify the data secrecy property. Using the dynamic IFT method, however, which can automatically propagate the sensitivity levels, is much easier and accurate for this purpose. Therefore, we evaluate this core using only the dynamic methodology.
We converted the design to Coq representation utilizing VeriCoq-IFT and used its automatically generated theorems and proofs to evaluate the trustworthiness of this DES core with respect to information flow policies. Coq-IDE successfully passes the proofs of the security property theorems for this design, thereby guaranteeing that, indeed, it does not violate any information flow policies.
B. Evaluation of AES Cores
AES [4] is a more sophisticated encryption algorithm as compared to DES, and can be performed using 128-, 192-, and 256-bit keys. Fig. 9 shows the block diagram of AES-128 which requires 10 rounds. Along with the genuine AES-128, Fig. 9 . AES-128 block diagram [4] .
the Trust-Hub website [14] provides various Trojan-infested AES cores. Given the complexity and pipelined structure of these designs, we only use the dynamic methodology implemented by VeriCoq-IFT to evaluate these AES cores. Also, since the Trojan-infested AES designs combine several leaking mechanisms with various trigger conditions, we group them by their leaking mechanism for a clearer presentation. Table I summarizes the Trojan infected AES designs which we evaluated using VeriCoq-IFT. For each of these designs, on a Windows 7 computer with 8 GB of RAM and an Intel Core i7 processor, the conversion process takes less than a second, while proof verification completes in about 30 minutes.
1) Genuine AES Core:
The genuine AES-128 core is a 10-stage pipelined design based on the block diagram shown in Fig. 9 . We marked adding round key operations (+ operations) as sensitivity reducers and we defined appropriate sensitivity levels for the inputs. Then, we used VeriCoq-IFT to convert this design to its Coq representation and we evaluated the automatically generated proofs for the security property theorems in Coq-IDE. The checking of proofs passes, confirming that this design abides by the information flow policies.
2) Group 1 of Trojan-Infested AES Designs: These Trojaninfested AES designs have an additional output in which the Trojan tries to leak 8 bits of the key using a CDMA like modulation [12] , [16] ; their block diagrams are shown in Fig. 10 . The intention is to connect this output, named load in Fig. 10 , to a large capacitive load, and create a power side channel. The Trust-Hub website provides this Trojan with various trigger conditions. As Fig. 10 shows, AES-T100 and AES-T200 are always on. AES-T700 and AES-T1000 are triggered by a specific plaintext input, while AES-T800 and AES-T1100 require a predefined sequence of plaintext values to be activated. AES-T900 and AES-T1200 are triggered after a predefined number of encryptions. Another variation in these Trojans is the value used to initialize the LFSR for generating pseudorandom numbers. In Trojans shown on the left column of Fig. 10 , the LFSR is initialized using a predefined constant value. Trojans on the right column use a subset of bits from the plaintext input to initialize the LFSR instead.
We used VeriCoq-IFT to convert these designs to their Coq representation and we evaluated the automatically generated proofs of the security property theorems in Coq-IDE. Thereby, we observe that checking of these proofs fails for the load output in all of these designs, indicating that VeriCoq-IFT can successfully detect the sensitive information leakage by these Trojans. Also, as expected, Coq successfully verifies the proofs of the security property theorems for Ciphertext outputs, as these do not leak any sensitive information. Fig. 11 . Second group of Trojan-infested AES designs which leak the key by AM radio. Fig. 12 . Third group of Trojan-infested AES designs which leak the key by establishing an internal side channel.
3) Group 2 of Trojan-Infested AES Designs:
This group of Trojan-infested AES designs leak the key by generating a radio-frequency (RF) signal on an output pin, which is intended to work as an antenna. They leak the key through amplitude modulation (AM), easily received and interpreted by a regular AM radio as meaningful beeps [17] . The difference between the Trojans in this group is the trigger mechanism, as shown in Fig. 11 . AES-T400 is activated by a predefined plaintext value. AES-T1600 is triggered by a specific sequence of plaintext input and AES-T1700 is activated after a predefined number of encryptions.
Evaluation of these Trojan-infested AES designs using VeriCoq-IFT shows that checking the proofs of the security theorems for the Antenna output fails for these designs. Therefore, VeriCoq-IFT can successfully detect this group of Trojans. Since these Trojans do not modify the AES core itself, checking the proofs of security theorems for the Ciphertext output in these designs passes in Coq-IDE, showing that no sensitive information is leaked by these output ports.
4) Group 3 of Trojan-Infested AES Designs:
The third group of Trojan-infested AES designs that the Trust-Hub website provides, shown in Fig. 12 , do not have a dedicated output to create the side channel for leaking the key. AES-T600, one of the Trojan-infested designs in this group, creates an internal load using a few inverters to leak the entire key and is activated by a predefined plaintext input. Another type of Trojan-infested design in this group generates 8 enable signals as a function of the plaintext input and 8 sub-keys. Each enable signal is used to activate rotation of the value in an 8 bit shift register, initialized with "10101010", to create a power side channel [12] . As Fig. 12 shows, this type of Trojans are provided with four trigger conditions similar to Trojans in the previous groups. AES-T300 is always on, AES-T1300 is activated by a predefined plaintext, AES-T1400 is triggered by a specific sequence of plaintext input, and AES-T1500 is activated after a predefined number of encryptions.
Since these Trojans do not use an explicit output, VeriCoq-IFT cannot automatically generate the information flow policy theorems for the internal load signals and shift registers. However, by marking the suspicious signals and registers as explained in Section II-B, we can instruct VeriCoq-IFT to generate such theorems for these signals. Following this step, checking the automatically generated proofs for the security theorems on these signals does not pass in Coq-IDE. This reveals that these signals obtain sensitive values, thereby alerting designers to perform further evaluations in order to either justify existence or remove such assignments.
5) Group 4 of Trojan-Infested AES Designs:
The last group of Trojan-infested AES designs that the Trust-Hub website provides consists of Trojans which do not leak sensitive information. These Trojans increase the power consumption of the design, with the intention of depleting the energy source (battery) more quickly, and use three different Trigger conditions: predefined plaintext (AES-T1800), specific sequence of plaintext input (AES-T500) and predefined number of encryptions (AES-T1900). Since these Trojans do not leak sensitive information, we exclude them from evaluation by VeriCoq-IFT. However, since the Trigger condition in two of these Trojans depends on the plaintext input, which is sensitive, we can use the same procedure as in Section IV-B.4 to check their safety. Such checking, however, requires design review by the IP consumers and cannot be performed automatically by VeriCoq-IFT.
C. Preventing Malicious Modification of Data
To evaluate our methodology for preventing malicious modification of data, we developed two Trojan-infested DES cores by slightly modifying the pipelined DES implementation, shown in Fig. 13 . These Trojans set the secret key to a constant value once they are triggered and have a simple structure.
The first DES Trojan is activated by a specific plaintext value. Using VeriCoq-IFT, we converted this design to the Coq representation and verified the information flow policy theorem. Since assignment of a malicious (modified) key is triggered by the plaintext input, this Trojan alters the sensitivity level of the key (due to a conditional assignment based on the trigger value), which then propagates in the design and violates the information flow policies. Therefore, the proof of theorems generated by VeriCoq-IFT fails Coq-IDE evaluation and the Trojan is detected.
Unfortunately, VeriCoq-IFT cannot always detect a malicious modification of sensitive data. As an example, the second DES Trojan is activated after a predefined number of clock cycles and does not change the sensitivity level of the secret key, because the trigger in this case has a sensitivity level of zero. Therefore, checking the proof of the information flow policy theorem passes for this design and the Trojan evades detection. Other methods are also possible to hide these Trojans. Hence, malicious modification of data cannot always be prevented by enforcing information flow policies. To prevent such meddling, we resort to the general PCHIP framework. In this case, we utilized VeriCoq-H to convert the genuine pipelined DES core to the corresponding Coq representation and developed theorems ensuring the authenticity of key bits throughout the design. Proving these theorems was performed hierarchically, wherein lemmas are first proven in sub-modules and then applied in theorems of higher-level modules to construct proofs.
As an example, lines 65-69 in the partial Coq representation of Fig. 14 define a theorem named key_sub1_genuine stating that the first round of encryption is done by an eXclusive-OR operation on the first sub-key (K1) and the corresponding signal created from the plaintext input (E). Also, this theorem ensures that the LSB of the first sub-key is indeed coming from the corresponding key input, according to the specifications. To prove this theorem, we used theorems crp_u0_X_eq_E_xor_k1 and k1_bit48_decrypt0_genuine which are proved in module_des, as seen in lines 27-50 of Fig. 14 . To prove crp_u0_X_eq_E_xor_k1 in module_des, we applied a theorem proved in module_crp which is a submodule instantiated in module_des. Similarly, the proof of theorem k1_bit48_decrypt0_genuine uses theorem k1_bit48_decrypt0_key_r which subsequently applies a theorem proven in module_key_sel, a sub-module of module_des. For Trojan-infested DES designs which modify the secret key, evaluation of proofs of these theorems in Coq-IDE results in failure, thereby enabling their detection by this generalized PCHIP-based framework. Crucially, this success relies on the hierarchical approach, facilitated by VeriCoq-H, which makes proof construction more streamlined and facilitates the creation of design libraries consisting of modules and corresponding reusable lemmas.
In order to compare the hierarchical to the flattened functional model, we also converted the DES core to the Coq representation using the flattened option and we developed the corresponding proof for the same theorem. The details of the converted code can be found in the supplementary material. While proof development style varies across developers (e.g., by proving different intermediate lemmas or employing different Coq tactics), the key advantage of the hierarchical functional model is that it provides separate Module Type definitions for each Verilog module. This modularity enables development of lemmas inside a module, independent of the higher-level module that instantiates it and without the need to track and globally define local module signals, as required by the flattened model. In turn, this supports lemma reusability, which can significantly shorten proof development time.
As an additional experiment to corroborate the advantages of the hierarchical over the flattened functioal model, we also developed theorems to protect the key in a basic RSA core. A clean and Trojan-infested version of an RSA core, which replaces the secret key based on a trigger condition, can be found on TrustHub [14] in VHDL format. After converting both versions to Verilog and applying the proposed method, we concluded that checking the corresponding proof passes for the clean design but fails for the Trojan-infested one. The codes for both the hierarchical and the flattened functional model, as well as the pertinent theorems and proofs, are provided in the supplementary material.
V. DISCUSSION
VeriCoq-IFT provides an automated PCHIP framework for information flow tracking in hardware cores, which is highly effective in preventing infestation of malicious capabilities seeking to leak sensitive data. However, similar to any other information flow tracking methodology, VeriCoq-IFT relies on trusted and accurate labeling of the initial sensitivity values and declassifying operations, in order to effectively track the flow of sensitive information in the design. In Section II, we described a procedure to find the initial sensitivity values of sensitive signals. Nevertheless, to make the best use of VeriCoq-IFT, designers and IP consumers should carefully review the VeriCoq-IFT labels in the design and should be able to justify them with precise reasoning based on a clean high-level architecture or block diagram of the design.
The scope of protection provided by PCHIP is limited by what is covered by the agreed upon security properties. Therefore, a carefully selected set of security properties is required, commensurate with the protection level sought by each application. Additionally, while enforcement of information flow polices can effectively protect the design against leakage of sensitive information, the scope of these security properties pertains only to information flow. For example, such security properties and, consequently, VeriCoq-IFT, are not geared towards guaranteeing functional correctness of the hardware design. Moreover, tampering with sensitive information cannot always be captured by enforcing information flow policies. Nevertheless, the general PCHIP framework is extensive enough to address such aspects of security requirements in a cryptographic hardware IP design by combining VeriCoq-IFT with the original PCHIP method, enhanced with VeriCoq-H to convert the functionality of a design to a hierarchy-preserving Coq representation whereon formal reasoning on functionality can be hierarchically performed.
Moreover, the generalized PCHIP-based framework is mainly geared towards design-level attacks which use primary outputs to digitally leak sensitive information. Stealing information through other means, such as side-channels (e.g. power, timing, etc.), is not directly addressed through the proposed methods. Nevertheless, such side channel-based Trojans may still be detected indirectly, as we presented through a few examples in Sections IV-B.2 to IV-B.4. This happens when a primary output, for which VeriCoq-IFT automatically generates security theorems, is proven by the proposed method to carry sensitive information due to malicious design modifications. If this signal is the source from which the side channelbased hardware Trojan obtains the sensitive data, such as in the MOLES [16] side-channel attack, the Trojan is indirectly detected. The same holds true when an internal signal is used as the source of leakage for the side-channel attack. In this case, however, the user needs to annotate the internal signals which are deemed suspicious, so that VeriCoq-IFT will automatically generate the corresponding security theorems. Such user guidance is not inconsistent with the practice required by many other hardware Trojan detection methodologies such as FANCI [18] , VeriTrust [19] or ATPG-based methods for Trojan detection [20] , [21] . Moreover, these methods focus on identifying nearly unused circuits or rare triggers as signatures for hardware Trojans and do not incorporate a notion of information flow. Hence, detection of a trigger is the only mechanism through which these methods may detect a side channel-based hardware Trojan. However, as summarized in Table I , several among the hardware Trojans that we studied in our experiments are always on and, therefore, evade these Trojan detection methodologies, while still being detected by the PCHIP-based solutions proposed herein.
Finally, our conservative information flow model implemented by VeriCoq-IFT is less accurate as compared to recently introduced methodologies such as SecVerilog [22] and the gate-level based information flow tracking for hardware Trojan detection [23] . Therefore, even though we have not encountered this situation in our experiments, it is possible that it may introduce false positives during circuit evaluation. SecVerilog, on the other hand, is not geared towards hardware Trojans, which is specifically considered in our methods, while hardware Trojan detection based on gate-level information flow tracking relies on model checking which is limited due to the state explosion problem in larger designs. Overall, the proposed work constitutes a powerful alternative approach for addressing data secrecy protection based on PCHIP-based information flow tracking, whose limitations may be further mitigated through further research and development.
VI. CONCLUSION
In part II of this paper series we described our efforts towards automating the extended PCHIP frameworks whose foundations we presented in part I. We first introduced VeriCoq-IFT, which provides a fully automated PCHIP framework for enforcing dynamic information flow policies, wherein designers only need to annotate the HDL code with minimal required information, such as the initial sensitivity levels and the declassifying operations. Based on this information, VeriCoq-IFT automatically generates the Coq representation, theorems and proofs required for enforcing information flow policies. In our experiments, VeriCoq-IFT successfully revealed design flaws and/or malicious capabilities hidden inside various genuine and Trojan-infested DES and AES implementations. We then presented VeriCoq-H, a method for converting the exact functionality of a design from HDL to its Coq representation, based on the hierarchy-preserving functional model described in part I. We demonstrated how it can be used to hierarchically develop proofs of security properties for a design and we detailed its utility through an example of preventing and/or capturing malicious modification of sensitive data in hardware cores. Notably, VeriCoq-H facilitates proof construction and development of hybrid hardware module libraries containing HDL code and proof of reusable lemmas for the module, thereby significantly reducing the burden of proof writing.
In our ongoing research, we plan to expand the capabilities of VeriCoq-IFT and VeriCoq-H by adding support for a few additional Verilog constructs, such as task and generate. Enhancing the information flow model and reducing its limitations by improving its accuracy, as well as studying the trade-off between the degree of functionality preserved in the converted code in the Coq representation and the protection level achieved, is another direction of our current efforts. We also plan to explore further automation possibilities in the general PCHIP framework for various hardware designs, such as microprocessor IPs and communication cores. Expansion of the automated PCHIP framework will help its wide adoption by the hardware design community, resulting in more secure and trustworthy third-party IP acquisition transactions.
